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Monetary institutions and inﬂation performance: cross-country
evidence
Bilin Neyapti*
Department of Economics, Bilkent University, 06800 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey
This paper presents an empirical investigation of the effectiveness of the institutional
frameworks of monetary policy in achieving and maintaining price stability. The
institutional frameworks considered are central bank independence (CBI), inﬂation
targeting (IT), currency boards (CB) and monetary unions (MU). Against the vast
literature that argues for the price stabilizing effects of each of these institutions, the
empirical evidence presented here suggests that countries that have adopted the IT and
CB regimes have, on average, been associated with lower inﬂation rates than others
during the past decade. This ﬁnding is robust to various control variables, while gov-
ernance appears to be a substitute to formal mechanisms.
Keywords: monetary institutions; inﬂation
JEL Classiﬁcations: E5, O1
1. Introduction
It is no mystery to a social scientist that high inﬂation is costly because it worsens
income distribution, raises uncertainty, deters investment and growth and causes macro-
economic instability. In a seminal work, Bailey (1956) presents a framework to measure
the welfare costs of high inﬂation; Fischer (1981), Cooley and Hansen (1989), and Lucas
(2000) argue that these welfare effects can be quite high. The key role that price stability
plays in achieving a healthy macroeconomic environment has been pointed out in numer-
ous other studies (including, for example, Cukierman 1982, Fischer 1981, Barro 1996).
The transition to the ﬂexible exchange rate system during the 1970s led to a revision
of the monetary policy frameworks around the world. Pursuant to this and to the two
major oil crises during the 1970s, many countries experienced episodes of increasing
inﬂation rates that had more severe effects on some than others. In the wake of the
rational-expectations revolution in the 1980s, adopting a nominal anchor gained increas-
ing acceptance as an essential tool of achieving price stability. In many developing econ-
omies, policy efforts to control inﬂation involved a money stock or exchange rate anchor
during the 1980s and 1990s. Eradicating the inﬂation inertia and preventing the unpleas-
ant monetary arithmetics, however, was not easy in many cases (see, for example, Bruno
et al. 1988, Calvo and Vegh 1999, Barnea and Liviathan 2008); as any public-good, price
stability tended to be underprovided.
Pioneered by Barro and Gordon (1983), Taylor (1993) and Kydland and Prescott
(1997), the ‘rules versus discretion’ debate highlighted the necessity of establishing
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credible commitment mechanisms for achieving price stability in order to curb ﬁscal
dominance or the temptation of short-sighted governments to generate surprise inﬂation.
The need to set the rules of the game for monetary policy via formal institutional
mechanisms gained prominence during the 1990s. As a result of reforming the monetary
institutional frameworks, inﬂation around the world has declined signiﬁcantly during the
2000s. This accompanies the observation that the divergent development processes of
several developing countries start to exhibit some convergence to those of the developed
countries.1
This study presents an empirical investigation of the impact on price stability of for-
mal monetary institutions, namely legal central bank independence (CBI); inﬂation target-
ing (IT); currency boards (CB); and monetary unions (MU), during the past decade. All
of these institutional arrangements reﬂect effort to reduce discretion in monetary policy
by way of increasing transparency and accountability and, hence, credibility (as in the
case of CBI and IT); or adopting a hard peg regime (in case of CB and MU) via legal
arrangements, even though the latter implies loss of monetary policy independence. Dur-
ing the 2000s, the number of independent central banks has been on the rise, although
there has been signiﬁcant variation in degrees of independence.2 Meanwhile, the number
of countries that adopted the IT regime has also risen. In addition, the members of mone-
tary unions have increased remarkably with the establishment of the European Union
(EU). Several countries have adopted a combination of these monetary institutions, espe-
cially the combination of CBI and IT. Parkin and Bade (1978), Grilli et al. (1991),
Cukierman et al. (1992, 2002), Banaian et al. (1998), de Haan and Kooi (2000), Arnone
et al. (2007), Cukierman (2008), Eijffenger (1993, 1995), among others, have argued and
empirically demonstrated that the independence of a central bank with the primary man-
date of price stability indeed helps achieve that objective. Cukierman et al. (1992, 2002)
demonstrate that de jure versus de facto measures of CBI matter in the developed and
less developed set of countries, respectively.3 Mishkin (2004) and Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2007) review the conditions for the effective implementation of the IT regime
and their important role in the experiences of countries with stabilizing inﬂation under
this regime. Deﬁning a measure of core inﬂation, target horizon and target band, as well
as escape clauses, are among the main features of the IT regime, highlighting the opera-
tional aspects of monetary policy. It is argued that transparency and accountability are
essential for IT’s successful implementation, which points at its symbiotic relationship
with CBI especially with regard to instrument independence. The success of both CBI
and IT also depends, in a good measure, on ﬁnancial market development and lack of ﬁs-
cal dominance.4 Furthermore, the status of informal institutions, or norms, are agreed to
be at least as important as formal ones in attaining the goal of price stability.
In view of the failing experiences of many countries with exchange rate anchoring
during the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, Hamann, 2001 and Husain et al. (2005)),
CBs and MUs emerged as institutional mechanisms of pegging a currency to a hard-
currency. It is, however, argued that the success of hard-peg mechanisms requires
stringent circumstances, while the beneﬁts of CB usually exceed the costs of losing
monetary policy independence for small countries (see, for example, Gertchev, 2002, and
Hanke, 2002) that peg their currency to the currency of the major trading partner. For the
beneﬁts of MU, Edwards (2006) argues that meeting an extended set of conditions
originally discussed in Mundell (1961) for the optimal currency area is crucial.
Against the background of the numerous studies that have focused on the roles of
speciﬁc monetary arrangements on price stability, the current paper is the thought to be
the ﬁrst that examines their relative contribution to this objective. Using cross-sectional
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data on up to 166 countries, and after controlling for the main structural characteristics of
countries, we show that countries that have either IT or CB regimes have had lower than
average inﬂation rates during the 2000s. The current study also shows that neither CBI
nor MU seem to add to low inﬂation performance signiﬁcantly. Inﬂation variability, on
the other hand, is observed to be higher the higher is CBI and the smaller is the country.
The empirical evidence provided in this paper sheds further light on the importance
of ﬁrst, having some sort of formal commitment device to price stability, and, second, the
role of the IT regime in maintaining price stability, given that low inﬂation was already
achieved by many countries by the 2000s. For small countries, on the other hand, the CB
regime helps to maintain low inﬂation rates. These ﬁndings can help form policy advice
regarding what works best under relatively low inﬂation environment. In what follows,
Section 2 presents the data and empirical analysis and Section 3 concludes.
2. Data, methodology and empirical evidence
Section 2.1 provides the description of data and methodology. Section 2.2 reports the
empirical ﬁndings and presents robustness checks.
2.1. Data and methodology
The average inﬂation rate around the world has been substantially reduced in the 2000s
as compared with the previous decades (see Figure 1, where each legend shows a
country’s average inﬂation rate, in logs, for the indicated decade).5 The average inﬂation
rates (in plain terms) for these periods (based on 134, 164 and 167 countries, respec-
tively) were 39%, 78% and 27%, respectively. Excluding Zimbabwe (a clear outlier) from
the 2000s sample leads to a world-average inﬂation rate of approximately only 7.5%.
To avoid the biases that may arise from the large variation in the (CPI) inﬂation data,
we follow Cukierman et al. (1992, 2002) in using a transformed version of inﬂation:
D=[π/(1+π]. This transformation is one-to-one and reduces the range of inﬂation data to 0
to 1.6 The Appendix reports the values of D and along with the list of countries used in
empirical analysis below.
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Figure 1. Inﬂation (in logs) performance during the past three decades.
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The indices of CBI, ranging between zero and one, as well as the dummy variables
that take the value of 1 in cases of IT, CB and/or MU regimes are listed in the Appendix
for each country in the data set. The CBI data compiled by Arnone et al. (2007) for 2003
is based on the original coding methods of Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al.
(1992), which identify a comprehensive and widely used set of criteria to measure CBI.7
We take the Roger and Stone (2005) study as the source of the list of the countries that
have the IT regime during the 2000s, to which we add Turkey, which had an implicit IT
regime until 2006 and switched to an explicit IT regime thereafter; and the Euro area. CB
dummies are based on the IMF classiﬁcation of the exchange rate regimes and monetary
policy frameworks.8 MU dummies are also obtained from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) (2005) and cover the Central African Economic and Monetary Union, the
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union
in addition to the EMU.
Because the institutional data are available mostly on a cross-section basis, inﬂation
rates (D) are also calculated in averages over the period 2000–2006, where available. The
number of observations common to most variables is 166, but it is reduced to 137 due to
the availability of inﬂation or CBI data.9 The inclusion of the macroeconomic data also
reduces the sample to 72 countries, due to the lack of availability of the data for the
latter. The sample in each case is comprised of a well-balanced set of data on developed
and less developed countries.
Table 1 shows that all these monetary institutions, with the exception of CB, are
positively correlated with the dummy for developed countries (DC).10 The especially high
correlation between IT and DC appears consistent with the administrative sophistication
needed for an effective implementation of IT. In addition, both CBI and MU show nota-
ble positive associations with IT; the ﬁrst of which is consistent with the nature of IT
requiring instrument independence of the central bank, while the second is mainly reﬂect-
ing the EU sample, which is considered under IT here due to the price-stability objective
deﬁned by the Maastricht Treaty, even though the implementation features may differ
from an IT regime. The table also shows, however, that MU countries that exclude the
EU countries do not show correlations with the rest of the institutions.
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, this paper investigates the impact of
monetary institutions on inﬂation using an OLS regression, after correcting for possible
heterogeneity in the error terms using the White-heteroskedasticity method. It is worth-
while stating that the focus of the paper is to explore the signiﬁcance of associations
between the institutional frameworks and last decade’s inﬂation performance around the
world, rather than exploring a causal relationship between these variables. Indeed, explor-
ing causality in macroeconomic analyses that involve institutional quality is usually a
futile task, and beyond the scope of the current paper, since the adoption of formal insti-
tutions is dynamically interwoven with economic development and stability.11
Table 1. Correlations among monetary institutions.
CBI CU MU(woEU) CB IT DC
CBI 1
MU 0.40 1
MU(woEU) –0.04 0.33 1
CB 0.04 –0.08 –0.03 1
IT 0.44 0.52 –0.06 –0.13 1
DC 0.51 0.51 –0.04 –0.11 0.75 1
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The basic regression to be estimated is as follows:
Di ¼ aþ b1MUi þ b2CBi þ b3CBIi þ b4ITi þ ei; i ¼ 1; :::; 166 ð1Þ
where α is the constant term, βis are the coefﬁcient terms that are hypothesized to be neg-
ative, ɛis are the random error terms and i is the country indicator.
In view of the higher likelihood of success of CB in small countries than others, the
regression is extended to control for a dummy variable for small-countries (S). In addi-
tion, to account for possible omitted variables, the developed country dummy (DC) is
also added.12 Table 2 reports these regression results, where the last column includes the
extended version of equation (1).
One could argue that monetary policy variables such as the exchange rate regime,
money growth rate can be used as explanatory variables in estimating inﬂation. These
variables, however, are themselves endogenous to the institutional frameworks that are
adopted with the purpose of shaping those policies in turn. Hence, following similar
empirical models, such as Cukierman et al. (1992, 2002), our empirical model focuses on
the role of institutional aspects of monetary policy in explaining the variation in inﬂation
across countries. We nevertheless test the robustness of our ﬁndings including past
inﬂation, deﬁcit and openness.
2.2. Estimation results
Table 2 presents the regressions of inﬂation (D) on each of the institutions separately,
in columns I to IV; as well as on all of them, in column V. The estimation results
reported in the table supports the hypothesis that all the monetary institutions consid-
ered in this paper, except for CBI, are, on average, associated with lower inﬂation
rates during the 2000s than those that lack them. The negative association remains
statistically signiﬁcant only for the IT and CB regimes, however, when all the institu-
tions are jointly employed to explain inﬂation. The addition of the DC and S dum-
mies does not change this ﬁnding, although both S and DC are also found to have
signiﬁcant negative associations with inﬂation. This result is predictable in case of
developed countries, where macroeconomic institutions are generally consistent with
policy credibility; for small economies, however, a general explanation would not be
appropriate given the large variation in their geography and the level of development.
In an attempt to explore whether there is a threshold value of CBI over which CBI is
effective, column IIIa also reports that for the case of high CBI (CBI > 0.6), CBI is
indeed signiﬁcant, though at the 10% level.13
Several sensitivity tests are performed: When the regressions are repeated without
excluding the countries with high inﬂation rate and with a dummy for Zimbabwe
(which is an outlier), the R-bar-squared rises to 0.65 (due to the high positive signiﬁ-
cance of the Zimbabwe dummy) although the reported ﬁndings remain virtually
unchanged.14 In addition, the regression model (equation (1)) is expanded by using
interactive terms (such as between CB and S; and between CBI and IT15); these inter-
active variables neither improve the ﬁt of the regression (the results reported above
remain the same) nor are themselves signiﬁcant, and therefore those results are not
reported. Furthermore, column I is repeated by excluding the EU sample from the
set; the resulting countries with MU still exhibit a negative signiﬁcant relationship
with D, as reported in Column I, although it loses its signiﬁcance in Columns V and
VI, as reported above.
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2.2.1. Robustness
One may also consider several other variables that may affect the inﬂation rate besides the
monetary institutions; the candidates are the past inﬂation rates, openness and past deﬁcits.
In addition, it may be argued that the general quality of governance,16 rather than of only
monetary institutions, may be related to low inﬂation rates. To test these hypotheses, equa-
tion (2) presents a speciﬁcation that includes the initial values (in 1990s’ averages) of the
above-listed macroeconomic variables; the governance index (gov) for the 2000s; and the
interactive terms of gov with the monetary institutions (MI): CB, MU, CBI and IT.
Dti ¼ aþ bjMIj;ti þ c govti þ hjðMIj;tigovtiÞþ
aðDt1;iÞ þ bðDeficit=GDPÞt1;i þ cðopennesst1;iÞ þ gi ð2Þ
where j stands for the four types of MI’s; i stands for different countries as in equation
(1); and ηi is the error term.
17 Time subscripts t and t–1 refer to the decade averages of
the 2000s and 1990s, respectively. The model can be extended to include the dummies
for three groups of countries: developed sample, transition sample (that were in the
1990s) and small countries (with less than 5 million people), the last of which is relevant
speciﬁcally for the success of CB. However, all these dummies are found insigniﬁcant in
the estimation and hence are dropped from the model.
According to Brambor et al. (2006), the lack of signiﬁcance of βj in equation (2), or
the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient of the interactive variable alone, is not sufﬁcient to
infer about the signiﬁcance the MI variables. In view of this, one can measure the mar-
ginal effect of MI variables on D by constructing conﬁdence intervals for the estimates of
(βj + hj) over the possible values of govj; if the interval lies above (below) the zero line,
then the effect is signiﬁcantly positive (negative).
Table 3 reports the averages of D, as well as the macroeconomic control variables by
country groups during the 2000s. The table indicates that D is notably higher in the
developing countries (LDC, deﬁned as 1-DC), where especially gov is also much smaller
than the rest of the country groups. In addition, it is noteworthy that while average CBI
in this period is 0.85, 0.53 and 0.74 in EU, Small and DC groups, it is 0.55 in the LDCs.
The observation that it is the institutional variables, rather than country characteristics,
that account for inﬂation differentials makes the case for reforming monetary institutions
stronger.
Focusing on the estimation of the extended model, the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4
(regression I), reveal that the basic results (signiﬁcance of CB and IT) reported earlier
(based on equation (1)) remains, where, in addition, past deﬁcits are also found to be
positively signiﬁcant and openness is negatively signiﬁcant. When gov is included
(regression II), however, the signiﬁcance of these terms is lost, whereas gov and past
deﬁcits appear signiﬁcant with the expected negative and positive signs, respectively. The
Table 3. The 2000s’ average of the macroeconomic indicators by country group.
2000s average
Country Group D Def/GDP open gov No.of Coutries
EU 3.6 1.25 112 0.81 26
Small (<5 Mill) 4.3 0.19 114 0.59 63
DC 2.1 0.81 110 0.89 24
LDC 7.3 1.08 91 0.46 146
Journal of Economic Policy Reform 345
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:4
7 0
3 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
goodness of ﬁt of the regression rises to 0.43. The unrestricted version of this model
reported in regression III also shows the recovered signiﬁcance of both CB and IT at the
1% level. Among the control variables, the past deﬁcit remains to be the only one that is
signiﬁcant, which is at the 10% level. To be able to interpret the interactive terms’
signiﬁcance, however, one needs to look at the conﬁdence intervals in Figure 2.
The 10% conﬁdence intervals in Figure 2 conﬁrm the insigniﬁcance of both MU and
CBI since neither of them is signiﬁcant for any range of gov. On the other hand, CB and
IT have signiﬁcant negative effects on inﬂation for especially low levels of gov. This
implies that high quality of governance lowers the contribution of both CB or IT to price
stability, which means that in countries where informal institutions are developed
(reﬂected by high gov) the adoption of formal monetary institutions appears less crucial
for attaining low inﬂation (the threshold levels of gov for rendering CB and IT signiﬁcant
is as low as 0.2 and 0.3, respectively on a scale between 0 to 1).18
A further robustness check of the results is carried out by an alternative estimation
technique, where the experience of banking crises,19 and the average levels of inﬂation
and budget deﬁcit during the 1990s is used to instrument the MIs during the 2000s. The
estimations results do not indicate any improvement with this approach, with no signiﬁ-
cant ﬁnding observed.
As an additional test, we ran the set of regressions reported in Table 2 by replacing
the dependent variable with the coefﬁcient of variation20 in inﬂation in order to explore
the sensitivity of inﬂation variability to CB, MU, CBI and IT during the 2000s. In these
regressions, except for MU, none of the MI’s is found signiﬁcantly negative. This result
is likely to be dominated by the longer decision and/or action lags of the EU’s monetary
policy processes due to its union-wide considerations. Including the country group dum-
mies leads to the following interesting observations. First, MU loses its signiﬁcance, but
both CBI and the small country dummy is observed to have signiﬁcant association with
higher than average inﬂation variability. Second, developed countries are observed to be
Table 4. Estimation results of equation (2).
Dependent Variable: D
RHS:
I II III
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Constant 5.93 (3.37)⁄⁄⁄ 9.45 (6.38)⁄⁄⁄ 7.64 (1.98)⁄⁄⁄
MU 0.57 (0.69) 0.27 (0.40) 0.52 (0.14)
CB 1.54 (1.95)⁄ 1.40 (1.23) 90.60 (3.05)⁄⁄⁄
IT 4.10 (4.17)⁄⁄⁄ 1.06 (1.24) 8.15 (4.07)⁄⁄⁄
CBI 3.94 (1.41) 5.09 (2.17)⁄⁄ 10.28 (1.42)
gov 10.58 (5.51)⁄⁄⁄ 6.69 (1.20)
CBI⁄gov 11.78 (1.20)
IT⁄gov 11.29 (3.63)⁄⁄⁄
CB⁄gov 156.80 (3.02)⁄⁄⁄
MU⁄gov 0.37 (0.08)
Deﬁcit/GDP (90s) 0.09 (2.29)⁄⁄ 0.12 (1.80)⁄ 0.13 (1.83)⁄
D (90s) 0.00 (0.56) 0.00 (0.80) 0.00 (0.70)
opennness (90s) 0.02 (2.49)⁄⁄ 0.01 (0.96) 0.00 (0.63)
Number of Observations: 72 72 72
R-bar-squared: 0.23 0.43 0.45
Note: ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄ and ⁄ denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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associated with signiﬁcantly lower inﬂation variability than others, as expected.21 Macro-
economic indicators considered in equation (2), however, do not have any explanatory
power for inﬂation variation.
To sum up, even after controlling for the main macroeconomic variables and country
groupings that may affect inﬂation performances across the world, this paper demon-
strates that formal commitments to price stability matter. More speciﬁcally, countries that
adopted inﬂation targeting and currency board regimes have managed to maintain lower
inﬂation rates than others during the 2000s. Informal institutions also matter, however, as
reﬂected in the signiﬁcant effect of governance in achieving price stability. The results
reported here pose reinforcing evidence in favor of the rule versus discretion.
3. Conclusion
The ﬁnancial sector is abundant with transaction costs and hence incomplete contracts. A
fundamental transaction cost arises from the uncertainty of the value of money due to
high and variable inﬂation, whose costs are analyzed widely in the literature. After the
hyper- and persistently high inﬂation episodes of many countries around the world in the
preceding period, the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s has witnessed a notable increase in price
stability around the world. Various monetary institutions designed as agents of credible
monetary policy have played a major role in this phenomenon. As Chami et al. (2010)
point out, rather than supply creating its own demand, ﬁnancial instruments, and more
broadly ﬁnancial institutions, develop in response to demand arising for them in the
ﬁnancial markets. Likewise, monetary policy institutions studied here are usually formed
to reduce the large costs of inﬂation that generate society-wide interest to avert them
(see, Posen, 1995). Achieving a stable currency, in turn, facilitates the development of
the rest of the ﬁnancial system by contributing to the enforceability of nominal contracts.
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Figure 2. Marginal effects of MIjs.
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Against the literature that argues for the effectiveness of various institutions of mone-
tary policy individually, this paper explores their relative roles in achieving price stability.
The cross-sectional evidence based on a large sample of countries indicates that countries
that have adopted inﬂation targeting and currency board regimes have, on average,
achieved signiﬁcantly lower inﬂation rates than the rest during the 2000s. These results
are robust to the inclusion of control variables, while quality of governance, a general
indicator of informal institutions, appears to be a good substitute for formal monetary
institutions. The adoption of formal institutions of price stability therefore seems a sufﬁ-
cient but not a necessary condition in case informal institutions are well developed. In
cases where the low inﬂation culture is not well-established (reﬂected in low governance
levels), inﬂation targeting and currency board regimes seem to be effective formal mecha-
nisms to achieve price stability.
Notes
1. See Lin and Rosenblatt (2012).
2. See the Appendix for the list of countries and their monetary institutions.
3. See Neyapti (2010) for a review of this literature.
4. See, for example, Posen (1995) and Neyapti (2003) for the case of CBI.
5. The data are compiled from the World Bank Development Indicators online.
6. An alternative could be to use the logs (or even the levels) of inﬂation, which does not alter
the results reported below.
7. The criteria list in Cukierman et al. (1992) covers, in broad terms, the objective, chief execu-
tive ofﬁcer, lending and policy formulation of the central bank. Grilli et al. (1991) distinguish
between the economic and political aspects of CBI.
8. See http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2008/eng/0408.html, where it is stated that ‘a mone-
tary regime based on an explicit legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for a
speciﬁed foreign currency at a ﬁxed exchange rate, combined with restrictions on the issuing
authority to ensure the fulﬁllment of its legal obligation’.
9. The descriptive statistics of D and the monetary institutions subject to this study are as
follows:
10. DC takes the value of 1 for countries that IMF classiﬁes as the advanced economies. Source:
World Economic Outlook, Sept. 2011.
11. Posen (1995), for example, asserts that it is not CBI but ﬁnancial opposition to inﬂation (foi)
that explains low inﬂation. Likewise, Berdiev at al. (2012) argue that the choice of exchange
rate regime is endogenous to political and institutional factors.
12. We do not use a dummy for transition economies since countries that were in transition in the
1990s are included in the list of developing countries in the 2000s.
13. Column IIIa reports results with a zero constraint for the CBI values that are lower than 0.6. A
similar reporting can be found in Cukierman et al. (2002) for liberalization index (CLI).
14. Angola, Belarus, Congo and Zimbabwe all had more than 100% inﬂation at least in one year
during the 2000s. Zimbabwe remains to be the only one with a high inﬂation rate as of 2006.
15. The ﬁrst of these accounts for the fact that CB is mostly effective for small countries and
effective implementation of the IT regime requires CBI.
16. Governance indices are provided by Kaufman et al. (2008), based on surveys that report six
different measures of the quality of political stability; control of corruption; rule of law; voice
and accountability; government effectiveness; and regulatory quality.
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17. Small country and developed country dummies are dropped to focus on the effects of structural
variables. When included, their coefﬁcients are observed to be insigniﬁcant.
18. In Canada, Japan and United Kingdom, for example, CBI is 0.63, 0.44 and 0.69, respectively;
whereas the level of gov, representing informal institutional quality is all above 0.8.
19. Data are based on Leaven and Valencia (2008).
20. The coefﬁcient of variation is measured as standard deviation divided by the sample mean,
which is a measure of variation that is comparable across.
21. These regressions are available from the author upon request.
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Appendix. Inﬂation (D) and monetary institutions
D MU CB IT CBI S
(⁄100) (1) (1) (2)
Afghanistan 12.42 0 0 0 0.63 0
Albania 2.60 0 0 0 0.75 1
Algeria 2.42 0 0 0 0.81 0
American Samoa na 0 0 0 na 1
Andorra na 0 0 0 na 1
Angola 49.39 0 0 0 0.31 0
Antigua and Barbuda na 0 1 0 na 0
Argentina 8.16 0 0 0 0.75 0
Armenia 2.80 0 0 0 0.81 1
Aruba 3.55 0 0 0 0.56 1
(Continued)
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Appendix. (Continued).
D MU CB IT CBI S
(⁄100) (1) (1) (2)
Australia 3.09 0 0 1 0.63 0
Austria 1.98 1 0 1 0.94 0
Azerbaijan 6.07 0 0 0 0.63 0
Bahamas, The 2.00 0 0 0 0.31 1
Bahrain 0.87 0 0 0 0.44 1
Bangladesh 5.36 0 0 0 0.19 0
Barbados 3.10 0 0 0 0.38 1
Belarus 30.10 0 0 0 0.44 0
Belgium 2.05 1 0 1 0.94 0
Belize 2.42 0 0 0 0.38 1
Benin 2.85 1 0 0 na 0
Bermuda na 0 1 0 0.44 1
Bhutan 3.70 0 0 0 0.31 1
Bolivia 3.99 0 0 0 0.75 0
Bosnia & Herzegovina na 0 1 0 0.88 1
Botswana 7.68 0 0 0 0.44 1
Brazil 6.79 0 0 1 0.63 0
Brunei Darussalam 0.33 0 1 0 na 1
Bulgaria 6.18 0 1 0 0.88 0
Burkina Faso 2.09 1 0 0 na 0
Burundi 8.62 0 0 0 0.38 0
Cambodia 2.82 0 0 0 0.56 0
Cameroon 2.12 1 0 0 na 0
Canada 2.26 0 0 1 0.63 0
Cape Verde 1.51 0 0 0 0.5 1
Cayman Islands na 0 1 0 0.38 1
Central African Rep. 2.33 1 0 0 na 1
Chad 2.59 1 0 0 na 0
Channel Islands na 0 0 0 na 1
Chile 2.99 0 0 1 0.69 0
China 1.60 0 0 0 0.56 0
Colombia 6.03 0 0 1 0.5 0
Comoros na 0 0 0 0.44 1
Congo, Dem. Rep. 61.04 0 0 0 na 0
Congo, Rep. 2.14 1 0 0 na 1
Costa Rica 9.89 0 0 0 0.69 1
Cote d'Ivoire 2.78 1 0 0 na 0
Croatia 2.83 0 0 0 0.88 1
Cuba na 0 0 0 0.31 0
Czech Republic 2.52 0 0 1 0.88 0
Denmark 2.01 0 0 0 0.75 0
Djibouti na 0 1 0 na 1
Dominica 1.51 0 1 0 na 1
Dominican Republic 12.91 0 0 0 0.56 0
Ecuador 17.07 0 0 0 0.94 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.36 0 0 0 0.38 0
El Salvador 3.35 0 0 0 0.81 0
Equatorial Guinea 6.16 1 0 0 na 1
Eritrea na 0 0 0 0.5 1
Estonia 3.94 0 1 0 0.81 1
Ethiopia 6.57 0 0 0 0.5 0
(Continued)
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Appendix. (Continued).
D MU CB IT CBI S
(⁄100) (1) (1) (2)
Faeroe Islands na 0 1 0 na 1
Falkland Islands na 0 1 0 na 0
Fiji 2.77 0 0 0 0.38 1
Finland 1.66 1 0 1 0.94 0
France 1.77 1 0 1 0.94 0
French Polynesia na 0 0 0 na 1
Gabon 1.24 1 0 0 na 1
Gambia, The 7.36 0 0 0 na 1
Georgia 6.04 0 0 0 0.75 1
Germany 1.63 1 0 1 0.88 0
Ghana 16.49 0 0 0 0.5 0
Gibraltar na 0 1 0 na 0
Greece 3.18 1 0 1 0.81 0
Greenland na 0 0 0 na 1
Grenada 2.32 0 1 0 na 1
Guam na 0 0 0 na 1
Guatemala 6.52 0 0 0 0.63 0
Guinea na 0 0 0 0.63 0
Guinea-Bissau 2.74 1 0 0 na 1
Guyana 5.94 0 0 0 0.5 1
Haiti 14.63 0 0 0 0.5 0
Honduras 7.57 0 0 0 0.5 0
Hong Kong, China -0.82 0 1 0 0.38 0
Hungary 6.00 0 0 1 0.94 0
Iceland 4.48 0 0 1 0.75 1
India 4.32 0 0 0 0.5 0
Indonesia 8.04 0 0 0 0.69 0
Iran, Islamic Rep. 12.46 0 0 0 0.38 0
Iraq na 0 0 0 0.63 0
Ireland 3.85 1 0 1 0.81 1
Isle of Man na 0 0 0 na 1
Israel 1.50 0 0 1 0.38 0
Italy 2.27 1 0 1 0.81 0
Jamaica 9.02 0 0 0 0.38 1
Japan -0.32 0 0 0 0.44 0
Jordan 2.96 0 0 0 0.38 0
Kazakhstan 7.79 0 0 0 0.75 0
Kenya 8.43 0 0 0 0.44 0
Kiribati na 0 0 0 na 1
Korea, Dem. Rep. na 0 0 0 na 0
Korea, Rep. 2.87 0 0 1 0.56 0
Kuwait 2.39 0 0 0 0.31 1
Kyrgyz Republic 6.43 0 0 0 0.88 0
Lao PDR 9.91 0 0 0 0.38 0
Latvia 4.72 0 0 0 1 1
Lebanon na 0 0 0 0.5 1
Lesotho 6.92 0 0 0 0.44 1
Liberia na 0 0 0 0.5 1
Libya -3.02 0 0 0 0.44 0
Liechtenstein na 0 0 0 na 1
Lithuania 1.82 0 1 0 0.81 1
(Continued)
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Appendix. (Continued).
D MU CB IT CBI S
(⁄100) (1) (1) (2)
Luxembourg 2.40 1 0 1 0.94 1
Macao, China 1.03 0 0 0 0.44 1
Macedonia, FYR 2.82 0 0 0 0.88 0
Madagascar 9.81 1 0 0 0.63 0
Malawi 13.55 0 0 0 0.38 0
Malaysia 1.94 0 0 0 0.5 0
Maldives 5.14 0 0 0 0.38 1
Mali 1.78 1 0 0 na 0
Malta 2.28 1 0 1 0.69 1
Marshall Islands na 0 0 0 na 1
Mauritania 6.22 0 0 0 na 1
Mauritius 5.64 0 0 0 0.5 1
Mayotte na 0 0 0 na 1
Mexico 4.95 0 0 1 0.69 0
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. na 0 0 0 na 1
Moldova 11.87 0 0 0 0.75 1
Monaco na 0 0 0 0.75 1
Mongolia 6.87 0 0 0 na 1
Montenegro na 0 0 0 na 1
Morocco 1.76 0 0 0 0.5 0
Mozambique 10.43 0 0 0 0.44 0
Myanmar 18.67 0 0 0 0.38 0
Namibia 4.83 1 0 0 0.38 1
Nepal 4.44 0 0 0 0.5 0
Netherlands 2.17 1 0 1 0.88 0
Netherlands Antilles 2.59 0 0 0 0.44 1
New Caledonia na 0 0 0 na 1
New Zealand 2.52 0 0 1 0.44 1
Nicaragua 7.32 0 0 0 0.56 0
Niger 1.97 1 0 0 na 0
Nigeria 11.03 0 0 0 0.44 0
Northern Mariana Islands na 0 0 0 na 0
Norway 1.83 0 0 1 0.75 1
Oman 1.52 0 0 0 0.31 1
Pakistan 5.41 0 0 0 0.5 0
Palau na 0 0 0 na 1
Panama 1.57 0 1 0 0.38 1
Papua New Guinea 6.83 0 0 0 0.63 0
Paraguay 8.03 0 0 0 0.5 0
Peru 2.11 0 0 1 0.69 0
Philippines 4.74 0 0 1 0.63 0
Poland 3.32 0 0 1 0.88 0
Portugal 2.94 1 0 1 0.81 0
Puerto Rico na 0 0 0 na 1
Qatar 5.53 0 0 0 0.19 1
Romania 15.81 0 0 0 0.69 0
Russian Federation 12.46 0 0 0 0.44 0
Rwanda 6.53 0 0 0 0.56 0
S. Cyprus 2.77 0 0 1 0.56 0
Samoa 4.82 0 0 0 na 1
San Marino na 0 0 0 na 1
(Continued)
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Appendix. (Continued).
D MU CB IT CBI S
(⁄100) (1) (1) (2)
Sao Tome and Principe na 0 0 0 0.31 1
Saudi Arabia 0.74 0 0 0 0.5 0
Senegal 1.98 1 0 0 na 0
Serbia 23.13 0 0 0 na 0
Seychelles 3.08 0 0 0 0.25 1
Sierra Leone 6.22 0 0 0 0.56 0
Singapore 0.95 0 0 0 0.38 1
Slovak Republic 5.74 1 0 1 0.63 0
Slovenia 5.04 1 0 1 0.81 1
Solomon Islands 7.75 0 0 0 0.38 1
Somalia na 0 0 0 na 0
South Africa 5.05 0 0 1 0.25 0
Spain 3.13 1 0 1 0.88 0
Sri Lanka 9.76 0 0 0 0.56 0
St. Helena na 0 1 0 na 0
St. Kitts and Nevis 2.04 0 1 0 na 1
St. Lucia 2.44 0 1 0 na 1
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 1.66 0 1 0 na 1
Sudan 7.05 0 0 0 0.31 0
Suriname 19.34 0 0 0 0.38 1
Swaziland 6.79 1 0 0 na 1
Sweden 1.45 0 0 1 0.94 0
Switzerland 0.94 0 0 1 0.94 0
Syrian Arab Republic 3.65 0 0 0 0.44 0
Tajikistan 12.99 0 0 0 0.81 0
Tanzania 4.50 0 0 0 0.38 0
Thailand 2.42 0 0 1 0.44 0
Timor-Leste 4.90 0 0 0 0.69 1
Togo 2.24 1 0 0 na 0
Tonga 8.18 0 0 0 0.31 1
Trinidad and Tobago 5.20 0 0 0 0.44 1
Tunisia 2.87 0 0 0 0.69 0
Turkey 21.54 0 0 1 0.81 0
Turkmenistan na 0 0 0 0.69 1
Uganda 4.38 0 0 0 0.56 0
Ukraine 10.18 0 0 0 0.81 0
United Arab Emirates na 0 0 0 0.44 1
United Kingdom 2.74 0 0 1 0.69 0
United States 2.70 0 0 0 0.75 0
Uruguay 8.14 0 0 0 0.63 1
Uzbekistan na 0 0 0 0.69 0
Vanuatu 2.18 0 0 0 0.38 1
Venezuela, RB 15.99 0 0 0 0.69 0
Vietnam 4.38 0 0 0 0.44 0
Virgin Islands (U.S.) na 0 0 0 na 1
West Bank and Gaza 3.33 0 0 0 na 1
Yemen, Rep. 10.80 0 0 0 0.44 0
Zambia 15.53 0 0 0 0.44 0
Zimbabwe 97.10 0 0 0 0.44 0
(1) Fund Surveillance Over Members of Currency Unions, IMF, December 21, 2005.
(2) Petursson (2004), Roger and Stone (2005).
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